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From the Ruling -
(snip)
“(i)f Congress [vests appointment power in a department head], it is ordinarily the department head, rather than the President, who enjoys the power of removal.” 561 U.S. at 493. Whether Congress may codify removal protections for inferior officers—the issue referred to in the Seila Law passage—differs from the question of who possesses default removal authority under the Appointments Clause.
As the Supreme Court has maintained for centuries, “the Constitution authorizes Congress to vest [appointment and
removal power] in the head of [a] department.” In re Hennen, 38 U.S. at 260. In those Case circumstances, “the President has certainly no power to remove” an individual lawfully appointed pursuant to that authority. Id.
Defendants next argue that if Ms. Aviel is the highest-ranking executive left at the Foundation, then she must be answerable to the President. ECF No. 40, at 14. But the same could be said of any inferior officer serving at the pleasure of a principal officer once the principal officer is terminated. Defendants’ position has worrisome implications: the President could easily circumvent the general restriction on firing inferior officers by simply firing the principal officers first.
That makes no sense. The Appointments Clause, Free Enterprise Fund, and established law would mean little if they were susceptible to such a basic loophole. The President may not fire an otherwise-unfireable officer by first terminating her superiors.
(snip)
“(i)f Congress [vests appointment power in a department head], it is ordinarily the department head, rather than the President, who enjoys the power of removal.” 561 U.S. at 493. Whether Congress may codify removal protections for inferior officers—the issue referred to in the Seila Law passage—differs from the question of who possesses default removal authority under the Appointments Clause.
As the Supreme Court has maintained for centuries, “the Constitution authorizes Congress to vest [appointment and
removal power] in the head of [a] department.” In re Hennen, 38 U.S. at 260. In those Case circumstances, “the President has certainly no power to remove” an individual lawfully appointed pursuant to that authority. Id.
Defendants next argue that if Ms. Aviel is the highest-ranking executive left at the Foundation, then she must be answerable to the President. ECF No. 40, at 14. But the same could be said of any inferior officer serving at the pleasure of a principal officer once the principal officer is terminated. Defendants’ position has worrisome implications: the President could easily circumvent the general restriction on firing inferior officers by simply firing the principal officers first.
That makes no sense. The Appointments Clause, Free Enterprise Fund, and established law would mean little if they were susceptible to such a basic loophole. The President may not fire an otherwise-unfireable officer by first terminating her superiors.
(snip)
Basically the judge is saying that 45 is arguing he can "get rid of" someone he doesn't like (someone down lower in the leadership chain) who was actually appointed by someone above them (a "superior officer" ), by simply firing that person above them.
Congress will explicitly "delegate authority" (as it is dubbed) to Senate-confirmed Department/agency heads, to select their own appointees, and 45 is torpedoing that idea.
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